

**Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to
Emergency Response to COVID-19**

Approach Paper: Methodology and Process

Independent Evaluation Office

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Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

| | |
|---|-----|
| Abbreviations..... | iii |
| COVID-19 Impact and Response | 1 |
| Global Context | 1 |
| Figure 1. GDP Cumulative Losses 2020-2023 (% of 2019 GDP)..... | 2 |
| Response of Multilateral Organisations/MDBs..... | 2 |
| Table 1. Summary Table of Response of selected MDBs | 3 |
| Response of NDB | 4 |
| Table 2. Emergency Program Loans—Summary Data | 5 |
| Table 3. Economic Recovery Program Loans—Summary Data | 7 |
| Evaluation Object and Rationale..... | 7 |
| object | 7 |
| Rationale..... | 8 |
| Evaluation objectives and scope..... | 8 |
| Objectives | 8 |
| Scope | 9 |
| Key Evaluation Questions | 9 |
| Approach and Methodology..... | 10 |
| General Approach..... | 10 |
| Evaluation Framework (Questions, criteria and information sources)..... | 11 |
| Challenges and limitations..... | 15 |
| Evaluation Team and Process | 16 |
| Annex 1. References and Links to Documents..... | 19 |
| Annex 2. Summary Table of Response and Policy Framework of Selected MDBs..... | 20 |
| Annex 3. Tentative Table of Contents of Evaluation Report..... | 21 |

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

| | |
|--|---|
| FIGURE 1. GDP CUMULATIVE LOSSES 2020-2023 (% OF 2019 GDP) | 2 |
| TABLE 1. SUMMARY TABLE OF RESPONSE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK OF SELECTED MDBS | 3 |
| TABLE 2. EMERGENCY PROGRAM LOANS—SUMMARY DATA | 5 |

ABBREVIATIONS


| | |
|----------|---|
| AfDB | African Development Bank |
| AsDB | Asian Development Bank |
| CNY | Chinese Yuan |
| COVID-19 | Coronavirus Disease |
| EQs | Evaluation Questions |
| IEO | Independent Evaluation Office |
| IsDB | Islamic Development Bank |
| JC | Judgement Criteria |
| MDB | Multilateral Development Banks |
| NDB | New Development Bank |
| PCR | Project Completion Report |
| PDB | Program Documents to the Board |
| PPEs | Personal Protective Equipment |
| SPRP | Strategic Preparedness and Response Program |
| USD | US Dollar |

COVID-19 IMPACT AND RESPONSE

GLOBAL CONTEXT

1. The COVID-19 pandemic was and continues, albeit to a lesser extent, to be a health crisis with few precedents. Its rapid spread, the unknown nature and evolution of the virus, and the need felt by leaders to respond led to a series of measures with severe and lasting consequences on people, economies, and future development prospects. The impact has been particularly severe on women, children, vulnerable populations including the elderly, and workers in informal sectors. The COVID-19 pandemic has been the largest global health crisis since the 1918 influenza pandemic when an estimated 50 million - 100 million people died out of a global population of fewer than 2 billion people. The pandemic has aggravated pre-existing weaknesses of healthcare systems in many countries, resulting in declines in access and quality of care. The impact of COVID-19 has contributed to a “general catastrophe” for education. United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) estimates that school children may be eight months behind where they would normally be. This marks a severe setback in progress toward the Sustainable Development Goal 4. The impact extends far beyond the health and education sectors.
2. Global output losses for the period 2020-23, relative to what was projected in late 2019, could amount to a total of USD 27 trillion at 2019 prices, or the equivalent of 22% of global GDP, with 18 percentage points can be attributed to COVID (see figure 1). For emerging market and developing economies, losses could be USD 9 trillion, or 26% of 2019 GDP, of which 23 percentage points can be attributed to COVID. Latin America and Emerging Asia have been affected the most. Middle East, Central Asia, and to a lesser extent Sub-Saharan Africa, are expected to benefit somewhat from the higher commodity prices. Trade volumes collapsed during the height of the pandemic, declining by 8% from 2019, although they recovered subsequently.

Figure 1. GDP Cumulative Losses 2020-2023 (% of 2019 GDP)



- Global unemployment rose to 6.5% in 2020, the highest level in the last 30 years, mostly affecting the young, women, workers with relatively lower educational attainment, and the informal sector. Unemployment has declined since then to the extent that some countries are facing labour shortages. About 90 million more people fell below the threshold of extreme poverty in 2020 compared with pre-pandemic projections. Despite the absence of data such as GINI coefficients, there is a general perception that the pandemic has caused a worsening of inequality across and within countries.

RESPONSE OF MULTILATERAL ORGANISATIONS/MDBS

- The United Nations Entities, Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) and the International Monetary Fund worked together to launch a coherent and coordinated response to COVID-19, scaling up existing coordination and building new relationships. The MDBs reallocated resources and developed fast-track processes to deliver support to countries at an unprecedented speed and scale. For many MDBs, support was primarily provided through development policy operations designed to provide additional financing for national emergency response plans, including initiatives to address the needs of the most vulnerable and promote continued delivery of basic services.¹
- Crisis-specific instruments were important for development policy lending, including the

¹ Inter-American Development Bank Group (2022) "Trends and features of Policy Based Lending at the Inter-American Development Bank".

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

Asian Development Bank's (AsDB) COVID-19 Pandemic Response Option (CPRO) and the African Development Bank's (AfDB) Crisis Response Budget Support. This support necessitated large-scale cancellations, re-programming, reallocation and frontloading of resources as well as Executive Board waivers to speed up project design and approval processes. In the case of the World Bank, existing development policy operations were expanded through flexible emergency components (e.g. Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Options (CAT DDOs) and Contingent Emergency Response Components [CERCs]). Throughout, there was continuous interaction between the MDBs, International Monetary Fund and World Health Organisation to promote policy coherence across these operations and mitigate the consequences of COVID-19 for macroeconomic stability. Overall, approvals for development policy operations among the World Bank, AfDB, AsDB and Inter-American Development Bank totalled over USD 60 billion between March 2020 and June 2021.² The response of selected MDBs is summarized in the table below (see Annex 1 for references and links to the underlying documents and Annex 2 for additional information on the response and underlying policy framework).

Table 1. Summary Table of Response of selected MDBs

| AfDB | AsDB | IsDB | World Bank |
|---|---|--|---|
| Identified USD 10 billion to be made available in 2020 for sovereign (USD 8.6 billion) and non-sovereign operations (USD 1.4 billion) with the objectives of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rapid, cost-effective and targeted emergency budget support - Liquidity support to Regional Member Countries (RMCs) - Support without deepening debt burden - Support to RMCs and Private sector | Initial commitment of USD 6.5 billion extended in April 2020 with to a total package of USD 20 billion for sovereign (USD 18.2 billion and non-sovereign (USD 1.8 billion) operations. In December 2020 ADB established the Asia Pacific Vaccine Access Facility (APVAX) with a resource envelope of USD 9 billion. | Indicative financing of USD 2.3 billion from across the Islamic Development Bank (IsDB) Group, increased to USD 3.07 billion in December 2020 and USD 3.55 billion in January 2021 and USD 3.64 billion in March 2021. Strategic Preparedness and Response Program (SPRP): Respond, Restore and Restart. | USD 12 billion facility proposed in early March, extended to USD 14 billion shortly thereafter and then greatly expanded in June. The ambition of the World Bank crisis response was to help client countries assist at least one billion people impacted by the COVID-19 crisis and to restore momentum on the Twin Goals of fighting poverty and promoting shared prosperity through support to Relief, Restructuring and Resilient Recovery. |

² This figure is an estimate based on organisational reporting. The true figure is difficult to calculate due to the fact that development policy operations sometimes include both COVID-related and non-COVID related components.

RESPONSE OF NDB

6. **Evolution of emergency program loan policy.** Following the World Health Organization declaration of the COVID-19 outbreak as a pandemic, NDB was one of the first MDBs to respond and mounted a significant emergency response in support of its five founding member countries. In a statement issued on April 22, 2020, the NDB Board of Governors welcomed the approval of Renminbi (RMB) 7 billion Emergency Assistance Program in Combatting COVID-19 to the Government of the People’s Republic of China. At the same time, the Bank’s Board of Governors welcomed that the Bank establish an Emergency Assistance Facility to meet the emergency needs of member countries. Such emergency loans to member countries could be used to finance direct expenses related to the fight against the COVID-19 outbreak or provide support to governmental measures contributing to economic recovery in member countries. The Bank targeted to provide up to total USD 10 billion in crisis-related assistance including support for member countries’ economic recovery.
7. Subsequently, the NDB Board approved a sovereign emergency loan to India under the facility at the end of April 2020 based on its endorsement of waivers of the specific emergency response features not supported by its existing policy framework. The Board requested a new policy to facilitate approval of future loans. The Policy on Fast-track Emergency Response to COVID-19 was approved by the Board on 10 June 2020. Three further emergency loans to South Africa, Brazil and Russia were made under this policy (see Table 2). Information on the first five emergency program loans is presented further below and is summarized in the following table.

Table 2. Emergency Program Loans—Summary Data

| Project Title | Borrower | Approval Date | Signing Date | Effective Date | Currency | Approved Amount |
|--|--------------------------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|----------|-----------------|
| NDB Emergency Assistance Program in Combating COVID-19 | The People's Republic of China | 19-Mar-20 | 20-Mar-20 | 23-Mar-20 | CNY | 7 billion |
| Emergency Assistance Program in Combating COVID-19 | Republic of India | 30-Apr-20 | 5-May-20 | 5-May-20 | USD | 1 billion |
| COVID-19 Emergency Program Loan | Republic of South Africa | 19-Jun-20 | 13-Jul-20 | 13-Jul-20 | USD | 1 billion |
| Emergency Assistance Program in Combating COVID-19 | Federative Republic of Brazil | 20-Jul-20 | 24-Dec-20 | 15-Jan-21 | USD | 1 billion |
| COVID-19 Emergency Program Loan for Supporting Russia's Healthcare Response | The Russian Federation | 25-Mar-21 | 14-Dec-21 | 14-Dec-21 | EUR | 0.87 billion |

8. **China Emergency Assistance Program in Combating COVID-19, Chinese Yuan (CNY) 7 billion (approved March 19, 2020).** The lives of Chinese people and the Chinese economy were broadly impacted by COVID-19; Hubei Province, Guangdong Province, and Henan Province, with the highest number of confirmed cases of COVID-19 were the hardest hit. The Program was NDB's first emergency assistance program in response to an outbreak in its member countries and was processed in a record time of one month from the request to NDB by the Chinese Government to the approval of the program by NDB's Board. The program financed the three Chinese provinces that were hit the hardest by the outbreak of COVID-19. It included innovations in loan structuring, rapid real-time response to COVID, development dialogue with relevant governments at all levels, prioritization of most critical issues amid the outbreak, and expeditious response to the identified emergency needs.
9. **India Emergency Assistance Program in Combating COVID-19, USD 1 billion (approved 30 April 2020).** India, like many other parts of the world, was heavily affected by the COVID-19. The healthcare system in India is still fragile relative to such an outbreak. The challenge was compounded by insufficient healthcare infrastructure such as disease detection, testing facilities and isolation wards, shortage of healthcare workers, and inadequate supply of oxygen, ventilation equipment and Personal Protective Equipment (PPEs). The NDB Program was aimed at supporting the Government of India in its efforts to contain the spread of the virus and reduce human, social and economic losses by:(i) preventing, detecting, and responding to the threat posed by COVID-19; (ii) funding critical healthcare expenditure to enhance healthcare capacity and strengthen national health systems preparedness; and (iii) providing immediate economic assistance to the vulnerable and

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

affected groups, thus facilitating economic and social recovery. Program financial resources were also to support the Government of India in strengthening its social safety net to reduce the economic and social impacts of COVID-19.

10. **Republic of South Africa COVID-19 Emergency Program Loan, USD 1 billion (approved 19 June 2020).** The impact of COVID-19 in South Africa was compounded by the country's socio-economic dynamics. The steps taken by the Government of South Africa included a national lockdown, rolling out extensive testing and contact tracing programs, and implementing a number of initiatives aimed at assisting vulnerable populations. The movement constraints in the country and containment measures implemented by its trading partners adversely impacted the economy and, particularly, the poor and vulnerable populations. The objective of the program was to assist the Government of South Africa in its efforts to combat the outbreak of COVID-19, minimize the loss of human life, and reduce social and economic losses. The program consisted of two components: Healthcare and Social Safety Net. The program was intended to enable recovery of economic and social activity through (i) procurement and deployment of critical healthcare goods and services; and (ii) increasing the amount of social grants paid out to beneficiaries to strengthen the country's social assistance measures.
11. **Brazil Emergency Assistance Program in Combating COVID-19, USD 1 billion (approved 20 July 2020).** The Brazilian Government declared a national health emergency associated with the COVID-19 outbreak and established a coordinated and comprehensive strategy to deal with health emergency needs, to support economic activities, and to prepare the foundation for recovery. Many national measures were complemented by states and municipalities, primarily responsible for the health response. The purpose of the NDB Loan was to support the Government of Brazil to strengthen social safety nets and to address immediate socio-economic impacts arising from the COVID-19 outbreak, particularly on the most vulnerable population in Brazil. The program was intended to support the financing of the Government of Brazil's expenditures incurred under Law 13.982/2020 that *"establishes exceptional social protection measures to be adopted during the period of confrontation of the public health emergency of international importance resulting from the coronavirus (COVID-19)"*.
12. **Russia COVID-19 Emergency Program Loan for Supporting Russia's Healthcare Response, Up to USD 1 billion equivalent (approved 25 March 2021).** With lockdown and social distancing measures in Russia gradually loosened in Q3 2020, the number of COVID-19 cases rapidly increased towards the end of 2020, putting stress on the national healthcare system and dictating the need to bring back social distancing measures. This took a toll on the country's economy, which the Government of the Russia Federation addressed via a nationwide action plan, which includes, among others, support to frontline health workers. The program aimed to address one of the most critical needs in Russia's healthcare

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

response to the COVID-19 pandemic through providing support to frontline health workers. It was mainly focused on payments to frontline health workers, including doctors, nurses and medical staff, who provide medical care for the diagnosis and treatment of COVID-19 infections.

13. The first five loans were followed by a second series of 4 further loans to Brazil, China, India and South Africa aimed at supporting economic recovery (see Table 3).

Table 3. Economic Recovery Program Loans—Summary Data

| Project Title | Borrower | Approval Date | Signing Date | Effective Date | Currency | Approved Amount |
|--|--------------------------------|---------------|--------------|----------------|----------|-----------------|
| NDB Emergency Assistance Program in Combating COVID-19 | The People's Republic of China | 2/26/21 | 3/18/21 | 3/18/21 | CNY | 7 billion |
| Emergency Assistance Program in Combating COVID-19 | Republic of India | 12/11/20 | 12/16/20 | 12/16/20 | USD | 1 billion |
| COVID-19 Emergency Program Loan | Republic of South Africa | 4/2/21 | 6/8/21 | 6/8/21 | USD | 1 billion |
| Emergency Assistance Program in Combating COVID-19 | Federative Republic of Brazil | 12/7/20 | | | USD | 1 billion |

EVALUATION OBJECT AND RATIONALE

OBJECT

14. The object of the evaluation is the entirety of the NDB COVID response program, with specific emphasis on the first five fast-track emergency loans provided by the NDB to support the COVID-19 response of its five founding member countries, as listed in table 2 above.
15. It is important to clarify, at the outset, that this evaluation is not tantamount to conducting individual project evaluations of each of the loans. Instead, while the evaluation will carefully examine the results, experience and lessons from each of the loan-funded operations in the five countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), its aim is to provide a wholistic and integrated assessment of the performance of the totality of the emergency program, drawing insights, lessons and recommendations for the way forward. The evaluation will however clearly highlight examples of good and/or less good performance practices that merit attention from the individual countries covered.

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

RATIONALE

16. The NDB emergency response to COVID-19 is the first program the NDB implemented to support its members' response to a global crisis that impacted all of them. The NDB wants to draw lessons from this experience. This will be addressed by an evaluation designed and carried out from a formative perspective. Unlike summative evaluations, which mainly focus on accountability, formative evaluations aim to draw lessons for future responses to comparable crises. The purpose is less to rate the relevance and performance of a program, based on experience and information available to the designers at the time of its formulation, and more to draw useful lessons for the future based on experience and information available to evaluators and designers of future comparable interventions. Similarly, "benchmarking" aims at drawing lessons from similar programs carried out by comparable institutions that could help formulate credible conclusions and convincing recommendations, even if these programs are more recent and benefitted from better information/experience than the program under review.
17. The evaluation is important and particularly timely, notably in light of the global attention focused on crisis prevention, preparedness and response. It is for this reason that it was included in the Independent Evaluation Office's (IEO) work program for 2023 agreed with the BoD.
18. Other MDBs have implemented comparable quick disbursing programs to support their client's COVID-19 responses. These MDBs provide relevant benchmarks to assess the relevance and performance of NDB's response.

EVALUATION OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE

OBJECTIVES

19. The evaluation will aim to report to the Board on the design, implementation and results and impact of the NDB response to COVID-19 and provide valuable lessons and recommendations to improve the Bank's preparedness and response to future crises. It will specifically assess the relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and impact of the Bank support to the COVID responses of its five founding Member States.
20. The standard criteria of sustainability will not be assessed in this context of emergency short term support. Most of the reports did not address sustainability as could be expected in the case of the emergency response through the first set of loans. Evaluating the sustainability of the outcomes of the second set of programs aiming at facilitating economic recovery will be more relevant, but it is too early to conduct a robust analysis about sustainability.
21. With regard to impact, taking into account challenges to establish a causal link between

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

the Bank's limited financing to the countries' response programs, the IEO evaluation will discuss impact by assessing the contribution of NDB's assistance to each country's own efforts in combating the COVID19 pandemic, as presented in the final reports of the five countries and the related, available PCRs. The evaluation will also seek to draw lessons from similar COVID response programs carried out by comparable MDBs.

SCOPE

22. The scope covers, in general terms, the entire NDB response program, with specific attention to the first five program loans dedicated to health expenditures and social safety nets implemented in that framework.

KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS

23. To achieve its objectives, the evaluation will address the following key evaluation questions³ as well as those in the evaluation framework on page 11 onwards. They will be assessed using both qualitative and quantitative data⁴ and analysis. Other questions may also be covered, should anything emerge during the evaluation process that merits consideration.

Relevance

- i. How adequate and strategic was the support NDB provided to the 5 countries?

Effectiveness

- ii. To what extent has the Bank's program achieved its objectives?

Efficiency

- i. How adequate were the financial and human resources deployed by the Bank?
- ii. How appropriate were the terms and conditions, interest rate, grace and repayment period of the loans?
- iii. How coordinated was the Bank response with the interventions of other development partners and with its other programs in the countries?
- iv. How efficient were the Bank's processes?

Impact

- i. Did NDB loans contribute to strengthening Government's ability, institutional

³ While all these questions will be covered by the evaluation, only some of them are repeated in the evaluation framework, which may be seen later in the document.

⁴ Majority of the quantitative data will be extracted through secondary sources.

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

- capacities and social infrastructure (in particular, hospitals and other medical facilities) to combat the pandemic?
- ii. Did the loans have a specific impact on poor and vulnerable groups including women?
 - iii. Did the loans help sustain government social protection programs?
 - iv. Did the economic recovery loans have a short-term economic impact?
24. As an overarching question, the evaluation will pay special attention to the question of how prepared NDB was to respond to the crisis in the interest of drawing lessons for preparedness for any future crises. This will include, *inter-alia*, the NDB capacity in an emergency situation for project design and implementation supervision, understanding of the budget systems of member countries, and others.

APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

GENERAL APPROACH

25. The Bank supported through its first five emergency loans one or two of the three main dimensions of the COVID crisis response of its five member countries: the health sector efforts to limit the loss of lives and the short-term socio-economic impact mitigation policies. It subsequently supported the longer-term economic recovery.
26. The above evaluation questions are selected and formulated to provide the Bank with useful lessons and recommendations, notably regarding the:
- i. Relevance of the policy to the Bank mandate and priorities and the alignment of the interventions with the Bank policy and the relevant national political frameworks
 - ii. Effectiveness of the Bank's program
 - iii. Efficiency of the Bank's interventions in addressing health or other similar crises in the future.
 - iv. Impact the NDB loans had on the country's capacity to respond to the emergency.
27. The Evaluation Framework is shown in the matrix on the following pages.

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

EVALUATION FRAMEWORK (QUESTIONS, CRITERIA AND INFORMATION SOURCES)

| Evaluation question (EQ) | Justification | Judgement Criteria (JC) | Indicators/Sources |
|--|---|---|---|
| Relevance | | | |
| <p>EQ1. How adequate and strategic was the support NDB provided to the five countries bearing in mind the emergency context ?</p> | <p>These programs must be aligned with the Bank's COVID response policy and national COVID response strategies.</p> | <p>JC 1.1 The NDB Policy on Fast-track Emergency Response to COVID-19 is in line with the general mandate and strategies of the Bank, based on the relevant lessons learned by comparable MDBs which addressed previous health crises, and sufficiently flexible to adapt to the COVID response strategies of the Member States (M.S.). JC 1.2 The nine programs supported by the Bank were designed based on diagnoses shared between the Bank and the Governments of the most urgent needs, country policies and institutional characteristics and capacities, and relevant lessons (if any) from previous crises responses in these countries. JC 1.3 The nine programs were aligned with the objectives and applied the prescriptions of the Bank COVID response policy (though this might not be entirely relevant for the loan to China which was provided before the policy was put in place). JC 1.4 Were the loan amounts appropriate in light of the pandemic situation in each country?</p> | <p>Documents. Bank mission statement and relevant strategies; Government COVID response strategies; five program PDBs, loan agreements and final reports Interviews with government representatives and corresponding Bank country staff and Task Managers</p> |
| Effectiveness | | | |
| <p>EQ2. To what extent has the Bank's program</p> | <p>Good knowledge and analysis of the overall effectiveness of the programs at output and outcome levels are</p> | <p>JC 2.1 Final reports data and analyses about the outputs delivered by the Bank's first five interventions and their contribution to the observed outcomes show that the</p> | <p>Documents. Final reports issued by the Governments, internal Bank Project documents including Completion Reports if available, and other</p> |

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

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| <p>achieved its objectives?</p> | <p>critical to drawing useful lessons from experience. All Member Countries have issued a final report as required by the loan agreements.</p> | <p>programs' objectives have been reached and provide elements to draw useful lessons. JC 2.2 Other sources, such as the Government's or other development partner reports, confirm that information and provide elements to assess the actual contribution and to draw lessons. JC 2.3 An analysis of the perception of the Bank's contribution effectiveness by Government representatives and NDB task managers confirms the final reports' findings and helps identify tracks to improve the effectiveness of the Bank's intervention effectiveness to address future pandemics.</p> | <p>Government and Development partners' analytical documents about the national COVID responses effectiveness. Interviews of Government officials and Bank country staff/Task Managers</p> |
| <p>Efficiency</p> | | | |
| <p>EQ3. How adequate were the financial and human resources deployed by the Bank?</p> | <p>Other MDBs' COVID response evaluations show that these institutions, surprised by the crisis's size and rapid evolution, struggled to dedicate enough budget and qualified staff to the response.</p> | <p>JC 3.1 The Bank was able to rapidly dedicate enough budget and qualified staff time to respond to the crisis.</p> | <p>Documents. Bank's operations internal reports. Interviews of Bank staff and managers</p> |
| <p>EQ4. How appropriate were the terms and conditions, interest rate, grace and repayment period of the loans ?</p> | <p>This is the first time the Bank has supported its members' response to a major pandemic with a quick-disbursing program loan. The terms and conditions of the loans should contribute to making them an efficient channel to support borrower countries' response to the crisis while being consistent with the Bank's capital structure and funding model.</p> | <p>JC 4.1 The terms and conditions of the NDB loans were perceived as appropriate by the representatives of the borrower countries JC 4.2 The terms and conditions of the NDB loans are comparable to those used for similar emergency response operations by other MDBs</p> | <p>Lessons from similar programs carried out by comparable MDBs Documents. NDB COVID 19 response policy document, the 5 loan agreements. Interviews of Bank staff and managers</p> |

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

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| <p>EQ5. How coordinated was the Bank response with the Governments, the interventions of other development partners and with its other programs in the countries?</p> | <p>Other MOs support the Member States response to the COVID crisis. Coordination between them contributes to a coordination of response to the crisis and better collective results.</p> | <p>JC 5.1 The Government effectively ensures coordination between development partners' interventions. JC 5.2 The Bank was aware of other partners' interventions and took them into account JC 5.3 The Bank ensured synergies with other partners.</p> | <p>Documents providing evidence of contradictions/competing actions Active coordination by the Government and of awareness of other partners' interventions. Interviews of Bank staff and managers, and selected representatives of other MDBs.</p> |
| <p>EQ6. How efficient were the Bank's processes?</p> | <p>The COVID crisis required MDBs to quickly adapt their processes to improve their emergency interventions' timeliness and overall efficiency.</p> | <p>JC 6.1 The Bank quickly adapted its processes and resource reallocation to allow for faster decision-making, preparation and implementation of its interventions. JC 6.2 The Bank's response was timely enough to provide effective support when it was most needed.</p> | <p>Documents. Internal Bank documents and databases Interviews with Bank staff and managers</p> |
| <p>Impact</p> | | | |
| <p>EQ7. Did NDB loans contribute to strengthening Government's ability, institutional capacities, and social infrastructure (in particular, hospitals and other medical</p> | <p>Assessing the impact of the contribution of NDB loans is useful to draw lessons for the future.</p> | <p>JC 7.1 The Bank loan contributed to the strengthening Government's ability and institutional capacity to combat the pandemic. JC 7.2 The Bank loan contributed to social infrastructure, particularly health-related, as a part of efforts to combat the pandemic.</p> | <p>Documents. Government final reports, Bank PCRs and other relevant documents.</p> |

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

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| facilities) to combat the pandemic? | | | |
| EQ8. Did the loans have a specific impact on poor and vulnerable groups including women? | Assessing the impact of the contribution of NDB loans is useful to draw lessons for the future. | JC 8.1 The Bank's loans have a specific impact on poor and vulnerable groups. | Documents. Government final reports, Bank PCRs and other relevant documents |
| EQ9. Did the loans help sustain government social protection programs? | Assessing the impact of the contribution of NDB loans is useful to draw lessons for the future. | JC 9.1 The Bank's loan helped sustain government social protection program(s). | Documents. Government final reports, Bank PCRs and other relevant documents. |
| EQ10. Did the economic recovery loans have a short-term economic impact? | Assessing the impact of the contribution of NDB loans is useful to draw lessons for the future. | JC 10.1 The Bank's economic recovery loans contributed to short-term economic recovery/impact. | Documents. Government final reports, Bank PCRs and other relevant documents related to economic recovery loans. |

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS

28. The following factors will impact the evaluation process and final product:
- a. *Evaluability of the program*: Evaluations are necessary to allow the Bank to learn lessons from its experience and be accountable to its Board. Evaluability is a major condition of the quality at entry of MDB's operations since it determines the quality of the monitoring and evaluation. The Program Documents to the Board (PDB), which are the project appraisal documents:
 - i. provide limited information about the logical links between the problem to address (the national COVID response policies need support), the different levels of expected results (outcomes and outputs), activities and inputs; this will limit the evaluation of the relevance of the intervention;
 - ii. do not always propose clear indicators, baselines and targets related to the different levels of objectives (outputs and outcomes), which could hamper the assessment of the program's effectiveness.
 - b. *Monitoring*: the PDBs and the loan agreements state that the monitoring of the program implementation and results is the responsibility of the Government but do not specify the kind of information the Bank needs to analyse its interventions from a formative perspective to draw lessons from that experience in order to better address similar crises in the future.
 - c. *Final reports*: the content of the final reports, as outlined in the loan agreements, is formulated from a summative perspective. The member countries have to confirm that the loan agreements have been implemented as agreed and contributed to the expected results. These reports provide few analytical elements on processes and results that could provide a basis for drawing useful lessons.
 - d. *Internal Project Completion Reports (PCRs)*: the timely availability of PCRs which are under preparation.
 - e. *Contribution assessment*: due to the nature of the Bank interventions contributing a small amount to, in some cases, very large and complex crisis response programs, the causal link between the resources allocated and the results is hard to evidence.
 - f. *Evaluation design*: the evaluation approach only provides for a limited number of interviews of Member Country Government representatives.

EVALUATION TEAM AND PROCESS

29. The evaluation will be conducted under the direct oversight and guidance of the Director General of IEO. The IEO Director General will be supported by Mr. Anil Sood (MDB and Evaluation expert), and an evaluation research analyst. The team will draw on additional external evaluation expertise, as needed. It will also be supported by Ms. Jaqueline Rabelo Souza, IEO evaluation communication and outreach expert. IEO will be responsible for the contents and quality of the final evaluation report and related outputs.
30. The evaluation will benefit from IEO quality enhancement processes, including internal and external reviews. With regard to the latter, Dr. Jose Graziano da Silva, former Director General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, will serve as Senior Independent Adviser (SIA). In particular, he will provide inputs towards the design of the evaluation and review the draft final report. Once IEO has prepared the final evaluation report, the SIA will prepare a final short (2-3 pages) report capturing his assessment of the quality of the evaluation and the recommendations contained therein. The SIA's report will be made available to the NDB Management, the countries concerned, and the Board of Directors.
31. The evaluation will be conducted in four phases:
 - i. **Finalization of Approach Paper.** The approach paper will be finalised following the inclusion of comments of NDB management and member country representatives.
 - ii. **Document Review.** The review of documents, already begun during the preparation of the approach paper, will be extended and continued through much of the course of the evaluation. The documents to be reviewed include relevant documents of the Bank, the Borrowing Governments and selected comparator MDBs. Specifically, these will include evaluations of COVID response carried out by the MDBs.
 - iii. **Data Collection and Analysis.** The data and information collection phase will include interviews with key stakeholders, to be conducted virtually. Key Bank counterparts in the countries will be interviewed including the Ministries of Finance and others concerned. Efforts will also be made to interview relevant representatives of civil society organisations⁵ in each country, as a proxy for collecting beneficiary feedback. Within the Bank, the relevant Task Managers and their managers will be interviewed and, if appropriate, invited to focus group discussions. In limited instances, the evaluation team may interview

⁵ For example, networks, associations, or NGOs, closely involved at the country level in combating the COVID19 pandemic.

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

relevant staff/managers of the comparator MDBs. Analysis of the documents and the information collected through interviews and focus groups will provide the input for the evaluation report. IEO will also take advantage of its project evaluations in 2023 to collect data on the COVID emergency loans.

- iv. **Report Preparation.** IEO will draft the main evaluation report. Annex 3 shows a tentative table of contents. As indicated there, the report will also cover NDB's preparedness for such crisis and adaptations that have been made since.
32. The draft will be shared with concerned in-country partners and NDB Management for comments and finalized taking into account the comments received. An audit trail will be produced illustrating how the comments received have been incorporated by IEO in the final report. Once the final report has been prepared by IEO, the NDB Management will prepare a written Management Response to the independent evaluation, which will be included in the evaluation report when published.
 33. The final IEO evaluation report, SIA's report and the NDB Management Response will be discussed in the Bank's Board of Directors meeting planned in September 2023. In line with the provisions of the NDB Evaluation Policy, key evaluation outputs (e.g., evaluation report, Evaluation Lens⁶ and others) will be disclosed to the public through the IEO webpages⁷ on the NDB website and using other communication instruments.

⁶ A two-page reader-friendly brochure summarizing the evaluation's findings and recommendations.

⁷ <https://www.ndb.int/governance/independent-evaluation/>

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

34. The timeline for the different phases and related deliverables is indicated below:

| Deliverable/Phase | Timeline |
|--|-----------------------------------|
| Draft Approach Paper shared with NDB Management and relevant member countries | 23 February |
| Comments from Management and member countries | 6 March |
| Approach Paper Finalized | 15 March |
| Document Review | February 13 – Week of March 13 |
| Interviews | Week of March 20 – Week of May 8 |
| Draft Report Preparation | Week of April 17 – Week of May 22 |
| Draft Report sent to Management and member countries | 29 May |
| Comments from Management and member countries | 26 June |
| Report finalized and shared with NDB Management for preparation of Management Response | July |
| Final evaluation report and NDB Management Response sent to Corporate Secretary | 24 August |
| Presentation to 41 st Board of Directors | 13 September |
| Stakeholder’s workshop to share the findings and results of the evaluation held in Delhi | 19 October (to be confirmed) |

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

ANNEX 1. REFERENCES AND LINKS TO DOCUMENTS

- African Development Bank Group (2020) "THE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK GROUP'S COVID-19 RAPID RESPONSE FACILITY (CRF)"
<https://elibrary.acbfpact.org/acbf/collect/acbf/index/assoc/HASH0140/d6f9805a/f0f48f47/3c5c.dir/AfDB%20COVID%20Strategy.pdf>
- AfDB IDEV (2022) "Evaluation of the African Development Bank Group's Support to Its Regional Member Countries in Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic" <https://idev.afdb.org/index.php/en/document/evaluation-afdb-groups-crisis-response-support-regional-member-countries-face-covid-19>
- Asian Development Bank (2020) "ADB's Comprehensive Response to the COVID-19 Pandemic"
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- IDB Group (2021) "Inter-American Development Bank Annual Report 2020: The Year in Review" <https://publications-iadb.org.translate.goog/en/inter-american-development-bank-annual-report-2020-year-review? x tr sl=es& x tr tl=en& x tr hl=en& x tr pto=sc>
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- Islamic Development Bank (2021) "Annual Report 2020: RESPOND, RESTORE, RESTART: POST-COVID RESILIENCE AND PROSPERITY FOR ALL" <https://www.isdb.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/2021-09/2020%20IsDB%20Annual%20Report%20FINAL%20QRC%20%281%29.pdf>
- Islamic Development Bank (2021) "Strategic Preparedness and Response Program (SPRP) Real Time Evaluation
- Multilateral Organization Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) "Lessons in Multilateral Effectiveness - More than the Sum of its Parts?: The Multilateral Response To COVID-19, Overview"
[https://www.mopanonline.org/analysis/items/MOPAN_COVID19_Overview_Final%20\(WEB\).pdf](https://www.mopanonline.org/analysis/items/MOPAN_COVID19_Overview_Final%20(WEB).pdf)
- World Bank Group (2020) "World Bank COVID-19 Response under the Fast Track COVID-19 Facility World Region – Proposed Investment in IFC Fast Track COVID-19 Facility Chair Summary"
<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/271831585274457435/pdf/World-Bank-COVID-19-Response-under-the-Fast-Track-COVID-19-Facility-and-Proposed-Investment-in-IFC-Fast-Track-COVID-19-Facility-Chair-Summary.pdf>
- World Bank Group (2022) "DEVELOPMENT POLICY FINANCING RETROSPECTIVE : FACING CRISIS , FOSTERING RECOVERY"
<https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/558621648492783178/pdf/2021-Development-Policy-Financing-Retrospective-Facing-Crisis-Fostering-Recovery.pdf>

Evaluation of NDB Fast-Track Support to Emergency Response to COVID-19

ANNEX 2. SUMMARY TABLE OF RESPONSE AND POLICY FRAMEWORK OF SELECTED MDBS

| AfDB | AsDB | IsDB | World Bank |
|---|---|--|---|
| <p>Identified USD 10 billion to be made available in 2020 for sovereign (USD 8.6 billion) and non-sovereign operations (USD 1.4 billion)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Rapid, cost-effective and targeted emergency budget support - Liquidity support to RMCs - Support without deepening debt burden - Support to RMCs and Private sector <p>The response was built upon engagement in policy dialogue based on the Bank Group's comparative advantage – legitimacy as an African institution. An underlying principle was to provide support without deepening the debt burden of RMCs.</p> <p>The crisis response budget support (CRBS) component of the program relied on the crisis response provision of the Bank's 2012 program-based operation policy. Guidance provided to staff through Guidance Note and note on Results Tools</p> <p>The guidance included a dedicated section on monitoring and reporting</p> <p>The guidance generally focused on preparation and processing stage and did not extend to implementation phase</p> | <p>Initial commitment of USD 6.5 billion extended in April 2020 with to a total package of USD 20 billion for sovereign (USD 18.2 billion and non-sovereign (USD 1.8 billion) operations</p> <p>In December 2020 ADB established the Asia Pacific Vaccine Access Facility (APVAX) with a resource envelope of USD 9 billion</p> <p>The ADB program relied heavily on number of adaptations of existing programs and policies</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of a COVID-19 Pandemic Response Option under the Countercyclical Support Facility for budget support - Expanded Scope of Contingent Disaster Financing under Policy-Based Lending to include Health-Related Emergencies - Expanded scope of ADF Disaster Response Facility - Expanded ADB Support to Private Sector for COVID-19 Response. - The Bank provided guidance, including on results frameworks, through a number of memoranda. | <p>Indicative financing of USD 2.3 billion from across the IsDB Group, increased to USD 3.07 billion in December 2020 and USD 3.55 billion in January 2021 and USD3.64 billion in March 2021. Strategic Preparedness and Response Program (SPRP):</p> <p>(R1) Respond: quick support to mitigate the immediate life-threatening health and socio-economic effects of the crisis</p> <p>(R2) Restore: protecting enterprises and household assets to support the resilience of the socio-economic fabric</p> <p>(R3) Restart: longer-term support to relaunch economic growth</p> <p>The total amount of financing of USD 2.4 billion approved by IsDBG by March 2021 represents 65% of the committed amount.</p> | <p>USD 12 billion facility proposed in early March, extended to USD 14 billion shortly thereafter and then greatly expanded in June. The ambition of the World Bank crisis response was to help client countries assist at least one billion people impacted by the COVID-19 crisis and to restore momentum on the Twin Goals of fighting poverty and promoting shared prosperity.</p> <p>3 stages:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Relief - Restructuring - Resilient Recovery <p>4 thematic pillars:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Saving lives - Protecting poor and vulnerable people - Saving livelihoods and jobs and - Strengthening policies, institutions and investments for rebuilding better <p>No new policies were put in place, but the Bank made use of provisions of existing policies that had never been used before:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - The Multiphase Programmatic Approach used earlier for multiple phases of a single country operation was extended to multiple countries - The World Bank Capital Package provided for a buffer for crises – that was triggered for the first time - World Bank asked for a shortening of the IDA cycle |

ANNEX 3. TENTATIVE TABLE OF CONTENTS OF EVALUATION REPORT

- 1. Introduction: Evaluation rationale and purpose**
- 2. COVID-19 impact and response**
 - 2.1. Global perspective**
 - 2.1.1. Impact of the crisis
 - 2.1.2. MDB Response
 - 2.2. COVID-19 impact in each of the NDB Member countries**
 - 2.2.1. Brazil
 - 2.2.2. Russia
 - 2.2.3. India
 - 2.2.4. China
 - 2.2.5. South Africa
 - 2.3. Response of NDB: the Emergency and Economic Recovery Programs (project portfolio analysis)**
- 3. Evaluation objectives, methodology and process**
- 4. Evaluation methodology and process limitations and mitigation measures**
- 5. Evaluation findings**
 - 5.1. Relevance**
 - 5.1.1. Relevance of objectives
 - 5.1.2. Relevance of design
 - 5.2. Effectiveness**
 - 5.3. Efficiency**
 - 5.4. Impact**
 - 5.5. Overall performance of the COVID19 response program**
- 6. NDB performance and preparedness for emergency response**
- 7. Borrower performance**
- 8. Key lessons and insights from other MDBs**
- 9. Conclusions**
- 10. Recommendations**